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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Navy forces are becoming increasingly dependent upon the Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) networks that support them.  This network is critical to the task of quickly 
putting effective weapons on important targets.  Today, the delivery of weapons by U.S. 
Navy air and surface forces is increasingly dependent upon critical targeting information 
that is often provided by a network of third-party sensor and communication systems.  
Along with this increasing dependence is a growing threat to this network by enemy 
forces.  Thus, an understanding of network capabilities and vulnerabilities is critical to 
the ability of our naval forces to successfully engage an adversary. The focus of this 
research is to develop a bi-level (attacker-defender) optimization model that enables us to 
map any current or planned C4ISR network requirements needed to execute a successful 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Warfare Analysis and Integration Department within the Naval Air Systems 
Command is investigating current and planned Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks to 
understand their strengths and weaknesses.  Their goal is to assist in the acquisition of 
systems that will make them stronger, faster, and more resilient in the face of an 
increasing demand for their services and increasing threats from our adversaries.  Part of 
this effort is to characterize the structure, capabilities, and objectives of these networks 
with mathematical and computer models. 
The focus of this research is to develop a bi-level (attacker-defender) optimization 
model that enables us to map any current or planned C4ISR network requirements needed 
to execute a successful kill chain, and to uncover any vulnerabilities within the network. 
Today, the delivery of weapons by U.S. Navy air and surface forces is 
increasingly dependent upon critical targeting information that is often provided by a 
network of third-party sensor and communication systems.  Along with this increasing 
dependence, is a growing threat to this network by enemy forces.  Thus, an understanding 
of network capabilities and vulnerabilities is critical to understanding the ability of our 
naval forces to successfully engage an adversary.  
We consider how changes to current network configurations based on modes of 
communication, asset placement, and enemy delay options can lessen network 
vulnerabilities to an enemy attack.  The systematic study of these alternatives requires 
significant network optimization by implementing electronic countermeasures, 
modification, and additional communications links.  
Our model provides optimal solutions for jammer placement and then is able to 
determine optimal communication paths based on those fixed jammer placements.  
Specific insights include redundant pathways, geographic separation of key nodes, and 
additional communications links.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
U.S. Navy forces, whether they are involved in conventional conflicts or hybrid 
warfare, are becoming increasingly dependent upon the Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
networks that support the execution of their operation.  These networks are critical to the 
task of putting weapons on targets.  The process of putting a weapon on a target is known 
as a kill chain, and is divided into a series of six distinct steps: 
• Find – locate target of possible interest, 
• Fix – isolate target, 
• Track – observe target continuously, 
• Target – decide target is of interest, 
• Engage – attack to with weapon with intent to destroy, and 
• Assess – determine if attack success. 
Today, the delivery of weapons by United States Navy air and surface forces is 
dependent upon critical target location information that is often provided to weapons and 
platforms by third party sensor systems forming our network.  This increasing 
dependence on distributed series of information transmissions is made riskier by growing 
threats to these networks by enemy forces.  Thus, an understanding of C4ISR network 
capabilities and vulnerabilities is critical to understanding the ability of our naval forces 
to successfully engage an adversary. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Warfare Analysis and Integration Department within the Naval Air Systems 
Command is investigating current and planned C4ISR networks to understand their 
strengths and weaknesses.  Their goal is to assist in the acquisition of systems that will 




their services and of increasing threats from our adversaries.  Part of this effort is to 
characterize the structure, capabilities, and objectives of these networks with 
mathematical and computer models (K. Amster, personal communication, July 17, 2009). 
Currently, the Warfare Analysis and Integration Department at the Naval Air 
Systems Command uses a set of standard protocols for establishing and configuring 
communications networks (K. Amster, personal communication, July 17, 2009).  Primary 
concerns focus simply on C4ISR network connectivity and most, if not all, networks are 
set up on an ad-hoc basis.  In most cases, this is adequate, but it can leave a C4ISR 
network vulnerable to enemy attack.   
The focus of this research is to develop a bi-level (attacker-defender) optimization 
model that enables us to map any current or planned C4ISR network requirements needed 
to execute a successful kill chain, and to uncover any vulnerabilities within the network.  
Vulnerabilities are described as a set of communications links whose loss or degradation 
has a significant impact on the performance of the C4ISR network.   
Some of the questions we address are: 
• How vulnerable is a particular C4ISR network to an adversary’s attempt to 
disrupt it? 
• How can we harden or modify the structure of a C4ISR network to reduce 
the adversary’s ability to disrupt? 
• How flexible is a C4ISR network in the face of a changing war-fighting 
environment? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
We model the vulnerability of a C4ISR network using a bi-level (attacker-
defender) optimization model, with the attacker being an enemy jamming our 
communications capabilities, and the defender being the operator(s) of the 
communications network.  A typical network is designed to transmit three separate modes 
of communication, each with its own separate sub-network.  Those modes are voice, data, 
and imagery transmissions.  Our operator model of a single C4ISR network determines 
optimal (i.e., minimal time) communications flows to complete a kill chain, and our 
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attacker-defender model pinpoints vulnerabilities in the system, allowing us to determine 
hardening and optimization of current and future systems. 
The operator model explicitly models a single C4ISR network and determines 
optimal communications flows in the absence of interference.  The model determines the 
shortest paths from source to destination of individual messages minimizing the total 
transmission and processing time of all communications in a network. 
The attacker-defender model explicitly considers an attacker’s capability to jam, 
or interfere with, communications.  Jammers can cause interference with reception of 
signals of one or more modes of communication at one or more nodes in our C4ISR 
network, depending on the jammer type and placement. 
The baseline scenario consists of a fictional strike plan where a communications 
network is established in order to locate and eliminate an enemy threat.  The 
communications network is comprised of the following assets (or nodes):   
• Joint Operations Center, 
• Tactical Operations Center,  
• Satellite, 
• Tactical Air,  
• Cell Tower Relay,  
• Special Operations Forces,  
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Large,  
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Small, and 
• Unmanned Ground Sensors. 
These assets are responsible for tracking and targeting a lone enemy contact.  The 
communications infrastructure consists of landlines, satellite communications, cell phone, 
line of sight radio, data uplinks, and unmanned aerial vehicle control to relay information 
and ensure a successful mission. 
Each step in the kill chain (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess) requires 
the receipt of information at a node (or nodes), within the network.  Nodes are points in 
the network at which information signals are either transmitted or received.  The 
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progression from one step to the next occurs only after specific actions are taken and the 
transmission of information to another node or set of nodes is complete.   
Several modifications to the baseline scenario are modeled.  These modifications 
include implementation of electronic countermeasures to interrupt the effects of jammers, 
changing node locations and configurations, and adding communications links to our 
network to provide alternative communication pathways.   
D. RESULTS 
All models and scenarios tested solve in fractions of a second, and preliminary 
testing indicates these models scale up to larger, more complex networks with only 
moderate increases in runtime. 
Our baseline scenarios show significant vulnerabilities.  As little as two jammers 
can produce considerable delays in communications flow.  We observe increases in 
transmission and processing times for communications ranging from 47% to 126% times 
greater than optimal communications flow. 
Follow-on scenarios show resiliency through the implementation of electronic 
countermeasures, modification or configuration changes, and reinforcement through 
additional links within the communications network.  With these measures in place, 
jammers have little effect on communications flows and incur only slight increases in 
transmission and processing times for communications.  Increases top off at only 15%. 
We conclude that vulnerabilities exist when networks have limited ability to 
employ countermeasures, confined area of operations, and limited alternate pathways.  
Resiliency occurs through redundancy of pathways, geographic separations of key nodes, 
and reinforcement of networks by presenting additional pathways for communications 
flow.   
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SCENARIO 
Our scenarios model a basic strike plan on a single, stationary target.  Assets (or 
nodes) used to conduct this plan include a Joint Operations Center, Tactical Operations 
Center, Satellite, Tactical Air (fighter aircraft), Cell Tower Relay (used for mobile cell 
phone communications), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle—Large, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle—
Small, Special Operations Forces, and Unmanned Ground Sensors.  Each baseline 
scenario involves the transfer of communication signals, or messages from one node to 
another within in the network as part of a kill chain.  Each message utilizes one of three 
modes:  voice, imagery, or data.  Each step in the kill chain requires the receipt of 
messages at a node within the network.  The progression to the next step occurs after a 
delay corresponding to specific actions taken at the corresponding node.  The scenario is 
finished upon completion of the “Assess” stage in the kill chain, signaled by the receipt 
of a “final” message at the destination node.  
The enemy has the ability to delay communications through jamming.  Jamming 
is the generation of signals (electromagnetic or infrared) by powerful transmitters in order 
to block reception of communication, radar, or infrared signals at a receiver.  “Radio 
broadcasts or radio messages can be jammed by beaming a more powerful signal on the 
same frequency at the area in which reception is to be impaired, using carefully selected 
noise modulation to give maximum impairment of intelligibility of reception”  (Markus 
& DeLia, 2010).  Communication disruption corresponds to a delay in incoming message 
transmissions to an affected node; due to an increased noise-to-signal ratio.  Most 
communication protocols will require retransmission until a successful receipt has been 
acknowledged.  For example, rather than taking sixty seconds to receive a message, a 
jammed node might take ninety seconds or longer, depending on the number of 
retransmissions required.  The enemy’s objective is to delay communications for as long 
as possible with their allotted jammers.  Jamming equipment can be placed by the 
attacker at any of a set of pre-disclosed locations.  For this scenario, there are four 
possible jamming locations, each affecting different sets of C4ISR nodes in the network.  
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In our scenarios, a jammer has an effective radius range of five miles although this can be 
made to be dependent on the type of jammer, location, etc.  Each jammer has the 
capability to affect a single mode of communication, but can affect any nodes within its 
five mile radius.  Again, these assumptions are easily generalized to depend on jammer 
type, geography, etc. 
Each asset is associated with at least one node in our network.  We use a multi-
commodity network flow model of our C4ISR network (see Ahuja, Magnanti, & Orlin, 
1993, for a comprehensive discussion on network flow models).  Assets that participate 
in more than one stage in a kill chain, or that move during operation, have multiple node 
names representing the same asset at different times and locations within the network.  
Table 1 associates each asset with its corresponding node name(s). 
Asset Node Name 
Joint Operations Center JOC 
Tactical Operations Center TOC 
Satellite SAT 
Tactical Air TACAIR1, TACAIR2, TACAIR3 
Cell Tower Relay CTR 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Large UAV1, UAV2, UAV3 
Special Operations Forces 1 SOF1 
Special Operations Forces 2 SOF2 
Special Operations Forces 3 SOF3 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – Small UAV_s1, UAV_s2, UAV_s3 
Unmanned Ground Sensors 1 UGS1 
Unmanned Ground Sensors 2 UGS2 
Table 1.   Node data 
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We develop our entire scenario on a single network of nodes to accomplish a 
strike plan.  Figure 1 provides a map of the nodes represented in this network.  The only 
difference between our scenarios is the specific patterns of communication signals used 
to complete the kill chain.  For example, one scenario uses the Joint Operations Center as 
the decision authority while another uses the Tactical Operations Center as the decision 
authority.  Use of one over the other changes the paths of communication signals, thus 
increasing or decreasing the completion time of a kill chain and changing the overall 























Figure 1.   Map of nodes within the communications network (From: Google Maps, 
March 8, 2010).  Each disk indicates 5-mile radius around a potential jamming 
location.  The cross near the center of the SOF nodes indicates a possible target. 
The arcs in this network are expressed in terms of the three modes of 
communication that utilize it.  Figures 2, 3, and 4 define these arcs and provide a 






Figure 2.   Graphical representation of voice sub-network.  Network is not geographically 
accurate.  Individual colors represent arcs from the same source node. For 
example, all communications flows from JOC are one color, TOC is another, etc. 
 
Figure 3.   Graphical representation of image sub-network.  Network is not 




Figure 4.   Graphical representation of data sub-network.  Network is not geographically 
accurate.  Individual colors represent arcs from the same source node. 
1. Scenario Timelines 
Each scenario is specified by a timeline of communications that correspond to a 
kill chain.  These timelines layout the scenario by the type of information required 
(commodity) for transmission from node to node.  Additionally, it conveys the “from,” 
“to” nodes as well as “time,” in seconds, needed to transmit the messages.  Completion of 
the scenario occurs only after transmission of the last message in the timeline.  Since 
these communications occur in series, the total communication time for a sequence of 
messages is just the sum of the individual times for each message plus any fixed delays 
that occur at each node.  Only items utilizing one of the three commodities are used in 
our model (grey shaded items).  Decision items incur fixed delays at a node and are 







No. Description Commodity From To 
Time 
(secs) 
1 UAV_s1 sends pictures to SOF1 Imagery UAV_s1 SOF1 180 
2 SOF1 decides if possible target Decision SOF1 SOF1 60 
3 SOF1 request UAV1 for possible target verification Voice SOF1 TOC 180 
4 UAV1 moves into position Decision UAV1 UAV2 240 
5 UAV2 sends pictures and starts to track Imagery UAV2 TOC 180 
6 TOC determines target worth attacking Decision TOC TOC 180 
7 
UAV2 automatically sends 
coordinates to TACAIR1 
support 
Data UAV2 TACAIR1 6 
8 TACAIR1 flies close enough to deliver weapon Decision TACAIR1 TACAIR2 300 
9 Weapon flies to target Decision WEP WEP 60 
10 UAV2 takes pictures, sends to TOC, BDA Imagery UAV2 TOC 180 
11 Determine target successfully attacked Decision TOC TOC 240 
Table 2.   Scenario One timeline lists the sequence of events in this scenario.  Information 
flows appear in grey, and decisions in white. 
No. Description Commodity From To 
Time 
(secs) 
1 UAV_s1 sends pictures to SOF1 Imagery UAV_s1 SOF1 180 
2 SOF1 decides if possible target Decision SOF1 SOF1 60 
3 SOF1 request UAV1 for possible target verification Voice SOF1 TOC 60 
4 UAV1 moves into position Decision UAV1 UAV2 240 
5 UAV2 sends pictures TOC Imagery UAV2 TOC 180 
6 TOC determines target worth attacking Decision TOC TOC 180 
7 TOC informs SOF1 to begin to laze target Voice TOC SOF1 60 
8 SOF1 begins to laze target Data SOF1 TACAIR1 6 
9 TACAIR1 flies close enough to deliver weapon Decision TACAIR1 TACAIR2 300 
10 Weapon flies to target via laser guided munitions  Decision WEP WEP 60 
11 UAV2 takes pictures, sends to TOC, BDA Imagery UAV2 TOC 180 
12 Determine target successfully attacked Decision TOC TOC 240 
Table 3.   Scenario Two timeline lists the sequence of events in this scenario.  Information 
flows appear in grey, and decision in white. 
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No. Description Commodity From To 
Time 
(secs) 
1 UAV_s1 sends pictures to TOC and starts to track Imagery UAV_s1 SOF1 180 
2 TOC determines target worth attacking Decision TOC TOC 180 
3 UAV_s2 automatically sends coordinates to TACAIR support Data UAV_s2 TACAIR1 6 
4 TACAIR flies close enough to deliver weapon Decision TACAIR1 TACAIR2 300 
5 Weapon flies to target Decision WEP WEP 60 
6 UAV_s3 takes pictures, sends to TOC, BDA Imagery UAV_s3 TOC 180 
7 Determine target successfully attacked Decision TOC TOC 240 
Table 4.   Scenario Three timeline lists the sequence of events in this scenario.  Information 
flows appear in grey, and decisions in white. 
B. MODEL OVERVIEW 
We designed a bi-level (attacker-defender) model designed to map the 
communications of a strike network and its vulnerability to attacker using General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) as the tool for optimization.   
Inputs to GAMS include the nodes, arcs, transmission messages (including 
starting and ending nodes), modes of communication (which are modeled as 
commodities), their specific arcs, and jamming locations.  Output provides optimal 
placement of jamming equipment and cost for each message.  
There is a growing body of research focusing on attacker-defender models for 
studying the resiliency of operational systems (see Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron, & Wood, 
2006, for a comprehensive discussion on defending critical infrastructures).  The above 
article focuses on applying bi-level and tri-level optimization models to make critical 
infrastructure more resilient to an attack.  Additional literature has been written that 
applies the attacker-defender model framework to IP-based networks where linear 
programming models are used to identify maximum data flow for an IP network 
(Barkley, 2008), and to jamming wireless communications networks through the 
placement of jammers using mathematical programs to obtain the optimal operation and 
jamming of these networks (Shankar, 2008).  This thesis however, allows for increasing 
 12
complexity in our communication networks.  Refer to references [6] and [7] for more 
general discussion of designing networks that are resilient to failures (Barkley, 2008). 
C. STRIKE NETWORK VULNERABILITY 
Within a strike network, a finite number of messages are required in order to 
complete a kill chain.  So in essence, we define a kill chain as a set of messages requiring 
transmission.  The successful completion of a kill chain occurs upon receipt of the final 
message.  On a lower level, we can define each message as shortest-path problem with 
the message using the shortest path from source to destination node.  Therefore, the kill 
chain is a list of successive messages or shortest-path problems.  Figure 2 gives visual 
representation individual messages within a kill chain. 
1 2 3 4 5
5 6 3 7 8
9 3 2 6 4
4 1 5 3 8
















Figure 5.   Hypothetical representation of successive messages depicted in a kill chain 
Jamming has the opportunity to affect multiple shortest paths depending upon the 
node it affects.  For example, a kill chain could be composed of five shortest-paths as 
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illustrated in Figure 5.  Each shortest-path uses five nodes to complete its path.  Jamming 
would be capable of affecting all five paths if they all possessed at least one identical 
node.  Figure 6 gives a visual representation of this effect on a kill chain. 
1 2 3 4 5
5 6 3 7 8
9 3 2 6 4
4 1 5 3 8

















Figure 6.   Hypothetical representation of a jammers’ effect on one node in multiple 
messages.  Here, node 3 voice transmissions are jammed.  Starred nodes incur 
delays, which correspond to increased transmission time on the highlighted arcs. 
This model assists in identifying those nodes and allows us the opportunity to 
strengthen the network.   
1. Model Assumptions 
The key assumptions made in this formulation are: 
• Jammers have an effective radius range of five miles. 
• Jammers affect specific commodities and are placed at one of four 
locations. 
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• Only incoming transmissions are affected, outgoing transmissions 
unimpeded. 
2. Set [~cardinality] 
n N∈   nodes in communication network (alias i, j) [~10] 
( ),i j A∈  arcs (links) in communication network [~25] 
k K∈  distinct messages required to create and execute a complete strike 
plan [~10] 
m M∈  mode of transmission (e.g., data, voice, video) [~3] 
( ), mi j A A∈ ⊆  arcs capable of carrying mode m traffic 
( )m k   mode of transmission required for message k 
ks N∈  source node for message k 
kt N∈   destination node for message k 
r R∈   jamming locations 
3. Data [units] 
m
ijc  cost (e.g., transmit time) for message of mode m on link ( ),i j A∈  
[sec] 
m
jrq  delay incurred at (receiving) node j if jammer used at location r for 
messages of mode m [sec] 
jammers  maximum number of jammers adversary can place [cardinality] 
4. Variables [units] 
k
ijXMIT  message k uses link ( ) ( ), m ki j A∈  [binary] 
rJAM        adversary places a jammer at location r [binary] 
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5. Formulation [Dual Variables for Inner Minimization] 
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The objective function (A0) calculates the total transmission time (including 
delays introduced by any jamming) for the messages over each of their communications 
paths indicated by the XMIT variables.  Constraints (A1) ensure that each required 
message follows a path from source to sink.  Constraints (A2) define the domain of the 
transmit variables.  Constraints (A3) limit the number of jammers emplaced by the 
adversary, and constraints (A4) define the domain of the jamming variables.  If a set of 
jammer locations is known, and fixed, the resulting problem is a minimum-cost network 
flow problem.  When all the JAMr variables are fixed at JAMr = 0, we have the standard 
operator’s model in the absence of any enemy jamming capability. 
7. Dual-ILP Reformulation 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
{ } ( )
,
max D0








k k m k


























The objective (D0) calculates the sum of the individual message shortest-path 
lengths.  Constraints (D1) relate the presence of a jammer to the resulting arc length 
bound on node distance labels.  Constraints (D2) set the dual variable at the origin of 
each individual message to zero, this is not necessary, but removes an unneeded degree of 
freedom in the dual variables for each message.  Constraints (A2) again limit the number 
of jammers emplaced, and constraints (A4) define the domain of the binary variables. 
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III. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
A. RESULTS 
We run four groups of three scenarios all in GAMS.  Our output provides us with 
several key pieces of information.  The operator model determines the optimal 
communications flow by providing the optimal XMIT variables.  The attacker-defender 
model determines the optimal JAMr variables and then determines the resulting optimal 
flows by solving the minimum cost flow model with the JAMr variable fixed at their 
optimal values, yielding optimal XMIT variables.  Table 5 provides JAMr variable data, 
Table 6 a list of the communication flow paths for each message k1 through, and Figure 7 
gives a graphical representation of the GAMS output.  They are the result of our baseline 
Scenario Two with two jammers.   
Jammer Location Jammers Placed at Location 





Table 5.   This table provides the JAMr variable results from Scenario Two with two 
jammers.  The table lists possible jammer locations and indicates whether a 
jammer is placed by a 1.0 (jammer is placed in this location) or a 0.0 (jammer is 








k1 UAV_s1 Æ SOF1 
k2 SOF1 Æ SAT Æ TOC 
k3 UAV2 Æ SAT Æ TOC 
k4 TOC Æ SAT Æ SOF1 
k5 SOF1 Æ SAT Æ TACAIR1 
k6 UAV2 Æ SAT Æ TOC 
Table 6.   Provides list of the communication flow paths for each message k1 through k6. 
 
 
Figure 7.   A graphical representation of the GAMS output provided in Table 6.  Labels 
for messages k1 through k6 are placed at the source and destination nodes of each.  
Different line styles symbolize separate modes of communication.  The solid line 
represents image, the small dotted line represents data, and the elongated dotted 
line represents voice communications.  The same legend above is applied to all 
future diagrams in this thesis. 
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We run each scenario five times, varying the number of jammers from zero to 
four.  We summarize all pertinent information in a table format.  Notice in the summary 
tables that as we increase the number of jammers available for use, not all locations are 
utilized for a scenario.  In those cases, an additional jammer would not increase the total 
cost and, therefore, no extra jammer is used, as illustrated in Table 7. 
Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 1152 - 
1 1632 r1 
2 1812 r1, r4 
3 1812 r1, r4 
4 1812 r1, r4 
Table 7.   This table provides a summary of the output data from Scenario Two.  The first 
column lists the iteration of jammers from zero to four.  The second column lists 
the iteration of cost data for each jammer scenario.  All values are provided in 
seconds.  The third column lists optimal placement of jammers.  Only one jammer 
is placed at each location for all of our scenario runs.  
B. VARYING THE NUMBER OF JAMMERS 
Initially, we concentrate on maximizing the networks cost from the enemy’s 
perspective.  The enemy’s goal is to maximize the minimum cost path (i.e., delay, the 
flow of communications through the kill chain process using jammers).  In our scenario, 
the enemy has the option of placing jammers in four different locations (r1, r2, r3, and 
r4).  Using our model, we can identify the optimal placement of these jammers.  We 
apply the following restrictions: voice transmissions are affected when a jammer is 
placed at location r4, image transmissions are affected at locations r1 and r2, and data 
transmissions are affected at location r3.  We assume that the maximum number of 
jammers allowed is four. 
1. Scenario One 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario One.  Our solution 
determines the optimal JAMr variables and then determines the resulting optimal flows by 
solving the minimum cost flow model with the JAMr variable fixed at their optimal 
values, yielding optimal XMIT variables.  Figure 8 is an initial look at the C4ISR network 
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with no jammers.  Figure 9 illustrates the solution to the scenario with one jammer.  Per 
our model, the optimal placement of this jammer is location r1.  Placing the jammer at 
this location jams the image flow from UAV_s1 to SOF1.  No other flows are delayed.  
Figure 10 illustrates the solution for the scenario with two jammers.  This run 
demonstrates the model’s ability to change flow in order to maintain the shortest path 
from source to destination node.  In Figure 9, voice transmission flowed from SOF1 to 
CTR to TOC.  In Figure 10, the model altered the path to flow from SOF1 to SAT to 
TOC.  Additional jammers do not have any added affect on this scenario because those 
locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.   
 
Figure 8.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  Disks indicate area of effect 
for jamming locations r1 through r4.  Each location has an appropriate flow (i - 
image, v - voice, or d – data) it is capable of jamming.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
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Figure 9.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 
location r1 affecting image flow. 
 
Figure 10.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  Jammers are placed at 
locations r1 and r4, affecting image and voice flow, respectively.  Although, 
another jammer is placed in location r4, it does not impact this scenario since 
flow is rerouted to avoid any delays. 
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Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 1032 - 
1 1512 r1, r4 
2 1512 r1, r4 
3 1512 r1, r4 
4 1512 r1, r4 
Table 8.   Summary of Scenario One’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the only inbound communications flow 
within range of any jammer location (r4), but it only affects voice 
communications. 
2. Scenario Two 
Figures 11, 12, and 13 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario Two.  Figure 11 is an 
initial look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 12 illustrates the solution for 
the scenario with one jammer placed at r1, jamming image flow.  No other flows are 
delayed.  Figure 13 illustrates the solution for the scenario with two jammers.  Again, this 
run demonstrates the models’ ability to change flow in order to maintain the shortest path 
from source to destination node.  Additional jammers do not have any added effect on 
this scenario because those locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.   
 
Figure 11.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 




Figure 12.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 
location r1, affecting image flow. 
 
Figure 13.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  Jammers are placed at 
locations r1 and r4, affecting image and voice flow, respectively. 
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Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 1152 - 
1 1632 r1 
2 1812 r1, r4 
3 1812 r1, r4 
4 1812 r1, r4 
Table 9.   Summary of Scenario Two’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows. 
3. Scenario Three 
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario Three.  Figure 14 is an 
initial look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 15 illustrates the solution for 
the scenario with one jammer placed at r1, jamming image flow.  No other flows are 
delayed.  This scenario has the greatest vulnerability since all communications flow 
through SOF1.  Additional jammers do not have any added effect on this scenario 
because those locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows. 
 
Figure 14.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
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Figure 15.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 
location r1, affecting image flow. 
Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 762 - 
1 1722 r1 
2 1722 r1 
3 1722 r1 
4 1722 r1 
Table 10.   Summary of Scenario Three’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES 
Next, we discuss implementing procedures to nullify a jammer location.  For our 
previous runs, we conclude that location r1 has the most influence on our network, since 
in all three scenarios; r1 was the location of choice when placing a single jammer.  
Neutralization is accomplished by destruction of jammer or by active or passive 
electronic countermeasures.  Passive electronic countermeasures seek to enhance or 
change the nature of the energy reflected back to enemy radars, but they do not generate 
their own energy; while active electronic countermeasure equipment generates energy 
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either in the form of noise to confuse an enemy's electromagnetic sensors, or by radiating 
false or time-delayed signals to deceive radio or radar equipment and their operators 
(Miller & DeLia, 2010). 
1. Scenario One 
Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario One.  Figure 16 is an initial 
look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 17 illustrates the solution for the 
scenario with one jammer placed at r4, jamming voice flow.  The flow is delayed since 
the model changed flow in order to maintain the shortest path from source to destination 
node for message 2.  Additional jammers do not have any added effect on this scenario 
because those locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.   
 
Figure 16.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  Jammer location r1 is 
removed to represent our ability to employ electronic countermeasures to negate 
any jamming capability.  No jammers are placed; therefore, no flows are jammed. 
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Figure 17.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  Jammer is placed at location 
r4, affecting voice flow. 
The resulting cost of this network is 1,032 seconds.  Placing jammers of given 
types at any of a given set of locations has no effect on this scenario because those 
locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the 
only inbound communications flow within range of any jammer location (r4) but it only 
affects voice communications. 
2. Scenario Two 
Figures 18 and 19 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario Two.  Figure 18 is an initial 
look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 19 illustrates the solution for the 
scenario with one jammer placed at r4, jamming voice flow.  No other flows are delayed.  
Two additional voice flows avoid jamming since the model changed flow in order to 
maintain the shortest path from source to destination node for message 2 and 4.  
Additional jammers do not have any added effect on this scenario because those locations 
do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.   
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Figure 18.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
 
Figure 19.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 




Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 1152 - 
1 1332 r4 
2 1332 r4 
3 1332 r4 
4 1332 r4 
Table 11.   Summary of Scenario Two’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows. 
3. Scenario Three 
Figure 20 illustrates the kill chain for Scenario Three.  It is an initial look at the 
C4ISR network with no jammers.  The additions of jammers do not have any effect on 
this scenario because those locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  
Our image and data commodities are the only inbound communications flow within range 
of any jammer location (r4) but it only affects voice communications. 
 
Figure 20.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
The resulting cost of this network is 762 seconds.  Placing jammers of given types 
at any of a given set of locations has no effect on this scenario because those locations do 
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not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  Our image and data commodities are the 
only inbound communications flow within range of any jammer location (r4) but it only 
affects voice communications. 
D. CHANGING NODE LOCATIONS AND CONFIGURATION 
Next, we will take a look at changing the locations and configurations of our 
nodes to lessen the effect of jammers.  The goal of changing locations is to limit a 
jammers ability to affect multiple nodes or affect the same node with multiple jammers.  
Figure 21 provides an updated map of new node locations and configurations.  The 
following changes have been made to this network; CTR and UAV2 have been moved 
out of jamming range; all assets have been moved out of jammer location r4 so it no 
longer has any affect on our scenarios; and SOF1 and SOF3 switched positions.   
 
Figure 21.   Diagram of updated nodes within the communications network.  Disks 
indicate jamming locations as well as area of effect.  The cross indicates possible 
target.   
By making the above changes to our baseline scenario, jammers have very little 
effect on our network.  The following diagrams give us a look at these scenarios. 
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1. Scenario One 
Figure 22 illustrates the kill chain for Scenario One.  It is an initial look at the 
C4ISR network with no jammers.  By swapping SOF1 and SOF3 nodes, this scenario is 
no longer affected by jammers because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the only inbound communications flow within 
range of any jammer location (r3) but it only affects data communications. 
 
Figure 22.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
The resulting cost of this network is 1,032 seconds.  Placing jammers of given 
types at any of a given set of locations has no affect on this scenario because those 
locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the 
only inbound communications flow within range of any jammer location (r3) but it only 
affects data communications. 
2. Scenario Two 
Figure 23 illustrates the kill chain for Scenario Two.  It is an initial look at the 
C4ISR network with no jammers.  As with Scenario One, by swapping SOF1 and SOF3 
nodes, this scenario is no longer affected by jammers, because those locations do not 
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contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  Our image and voice commodities are the 
only inbound communications flow within range of any jammer location (r3) but it only 
affects data communications. 
 
Figure 23.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
The resulting cost of this network is 1,152 seconds.  Placing jammers of given 
types at any of a given set of locations has no affect on this scenario because those 
locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  Our image and voice 
commodities are the only inbound communications flow within range of any jammer 
location (r3) but it only affects data communications. 
3. Scenario Three 
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario Three.  Figure 24 is an 
initial look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 25 illustrates the solution for 
the scenario with one jammer placed at r3, jamming data flow.  No other flows are 
delayed because those locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows. 
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Figure 24.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
 
Figure 25.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 




Jammers Cost Locations 
0 762 - 
1 822 r3 
2 822 r3 
3 822 r3 
4 822 r3 
Table 12.   Summary of Scenario Three’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows. 
E. STRENGTHENING IMAGE AND DATA SUB-NETWORKS 
Finally, we examine the impact of strengthening the network by adding arcs.  Of 
the three commodities, image is the most vulnerable since its network is the most sparse, 
e.g., not as many arcs in the network as compared to the other commodities.  
Additionally, a delay on the image sub-network (480 secs) costs approximately two and a 
half times more than a delay on the voice sub-network (180 secs) and eight times more 
than a delay on the data sub-network (60 secs).   
To strengthen the image sub-network, we establish additional arcs between 
unmanned aerial vehicle – small and the other two SOF nodes (SOF2 and SOF3).  These 
additions add six arcs to the image sub-network.  Additionally, we use those arcs to 





Figure 26.   Graphical representation of new image sub-network.  Dotted lines designate 
new arcs.  Network is not geographically accurate. 
 
Figure 27.   Graphical representation of new data sub-network.  Dotted lines designate 
new arcs.  Network is not geographically accurate. 
1. Scenario One 
Figures 28, 29, and 30 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario One.  Figure 28 is an 
initial look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 29 illustrates the solution for 
the scenario with one jammer placed at r1, jamming image flow.  Figure 30 illustrates the 
solution for the scenario with two jammers placed at location r1 and r4.  Again, this run 
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demonstrates the models’ ability to change flow in order to maintain the shortest path 
from source to destination node.  Additional jammers do not have any added effect on 
this scenario because those locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  
The scenario remains unchanged from our baseline due to the increase in arcs for image 
and data sub-networks. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 





Figure 29.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 
location r1, affecting image flow. 
 
Figure 30.   Diagram of Scenario One with appropriate arcs.  Jammers are placed at 
locations r1 and r4, affecting image and voice flow, respectively.  Although 
another jammer is placed in location r4, it does not impact this scenario since 
flow is rerouted to avoid any delays. 
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Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 1032 - 
1 1512 r1, r4 
2 1512 r1, r4 
3 1512 r1, r4 
4 1512 r1, r4 
Table 13.   Summary of Scenario One’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the only inbound communications flow 
within range of any jammer location (r4), but it only affects voice 
communications. 
2. Scenario Two 
Figures 31, 32, and 33 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario Two.  Figure 31 is an 
initial look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 32 illustrates the solution for 
the scenario with one jammer placed at r1, jamming image flow.  Figure 33 illustrates the 
solution for the scenario with two jammers placed at location r1 and r4.  Again, the 
model changes flow in order to maintain the shortest path from source to destination 
node.  Additional jammers do not have any added effect on this scenario because those 
locations do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  The scenario remains 
unchanged from our baseline due to the increase in arcs for image and data sub-networks. 
 
Figure 31.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
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Figure 32.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 
location r1, affecting image flow. 
 
Figure 33.   Diagram of Scenario Two with appropriate arcs.  Jammers are placed at 





Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 1152 - 
1 1632 r1 
2 1812 r1, r4 
3 1812 r1, r4 
4 1812 r1, r4 
Table 14.   Summary of Scenario Two’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows. 
3. Scenario Three 
Scenario Three provides the only changes due to the increase in image and data 
sub-networks.  Figures 34 and 35 illustrate the kill chain for Scenario Three.  Figure 34 is 
an initial look at the C4ISR network with no jammers.  Figure 35 illustrates the solution 
for the scenario with one jammer placed at r1, jamming image flow.  The model changes 
image flow in order to maintain the shortest path by directing flow from SOF1 to SOF3.  
Additional jammers do not have any added effect on this scenario because those locations 
do not contain nodes that have any inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the only 
inbound communications flow within range of any jammer location (r3) but it only 
affects data communications. 
 
Figure 34.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  No jammers are placed; 
therefore, no flows are jammed. 
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Figure 35.   Diagram of Scenario Three with appropriate arcs.  A jammer is placed at 
location r1, affecting image flow. 
Jammers Cost (seconds) Locations 
0 762 - 
1 1242 r1 
2 1242 r1 
3 1242 r1 
4 1242 r1 
Table 15.   Summary of Scenario Three’s output.  Additional jammers do not have any effect 
on this network because those locations do not contain nodes that have any 
inbound flows.  Our image commodity is the only inbound communications flow 
within range of any jammer location (r3), but it only affects data communications. 
F. WHAT THE RESULTS REVEAL 
By implementing electronic countermeasures, modifying node locations and 
configurations, and strengthening the communications network through additional links, 
we have been able create a network which is less vulnerable and more robust in terms of 
its effectiveness against an enemy’s ability to attack.  The attacker-defender model, in 
particular, is able to determine the optimal JAMr variables and then determine the 




fixed at their optimal values, yielding optimal XMIT variables.  It provides specific 
insights on redundant pathways, separation of key nodes; and additional communications 




In this thesis, we describe two models.  Our operator model of a single C4ISR 
network determining optimal (i.e., minimal time) communications flows, and our 
attacker-defender model pinpoints vulnerabilities in the system, allowing us to determine 
hardening and optimization of current and future systems. 
All models and scenarios tested solve in fractions of a second, and preliminary 
testing indicates these models scale up to larger, more complex networks with only 
moderate increases in runtime. 
B. OPERATIONAL USES 
This optimization model enables its user to perform and array of analysis on 
multiple communications networks.  The number of possible combinations for model 
parameters is large considering number of jammers, their location, range, capacity, nodes, 
their placement, configurations, and solutions. 
Currently, the Warfare Analysis and Integration Department at the Naval Air 
Systems Command uses standard protocols while configuring communications networks.  
Primary concerns focus on C4ISR network connectivity and therefore most, if not all, 
networks are set up on an ad-hoc basis.  In most cases this is adequate, but it can leave a 
C4ISR network vulnerable to enemy attack.  This tool enables the user to set up a 
network against a possible enemy, run a scenario, gather results, and reconfigure if 
necessary to obtain a better result.   
C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Possible future development can be seen in the creation of a graphical user 
interface (GUI) that interacts with GAMS, improvements in the GAMS formulation to 
include additional communications within a network rather than key elements of a kill 
chain, and increased network complexity. 
 44
1. Create a Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
Currently, all pertinent information is entered directly into GAMS to run the 
formulation.  This task can become daunting given more complex networks.  A GUI 
would improve user interface and lessen the possibility of mistakes.  It additionally gives 
the user more flexibility when configuring networks by decreasing preparation time. 
2. Strengthen Formulation 
The formulation only takes into account communications needed to complete a 
kill chain.  Even still, not all items within a kill chain are accounted for.  This thesis 
concentrates its efforts on imagery, voice, and data communications.  Delays at nodes, 
due to decisions, and control communications used for controlling UAVs, as well as 
others, are not used in this formulation.   
The inclusion of these parts would provide a more detailed account of how 
communication networks behave while also providing an improved means of configuring 
networks to lessen the affects of an enemy attack. 
3. Network Complexity 
Future testing should include larger scenarios with more complex 
communications requirements.  Further model develop should also include handling 
multiple simultaneous targets, as would occur during major operations. 
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